Bolivia, Venezuela Vote Again AS/COA Online 01/21/09

Bolivians vote January 25 in a constitutional referendum. (AP Photo)

Voters in Bolivia are weighing in on their political futures as they take their turns in referenda once again. On January 25, Bolivians headed to the ballot box to vote in favor of a long-delayed constitutional referendum promised during President Evo Morales’ 2005 campaign. On February 15, voters in neighboring Venezuela participate in their own referendum on whether their president can seek indefinite reelection powers.
On Sunday, Bolivians approved the new constitution by as much as 60 percent, boosting Evo Morales’ mandate. The Cochabamba-based Democracy Center outlines top issues dealt with in the 411 articles of the new constitution, from reelection to land reform. The document would allow Morales to seek reelection once, opens the door to government takeover of unused tracts of land, limits the amount of land that could be purchased, and sets up risk-sharing arrangements for private oil firms, and guarantee access to social security.

Despite the strong showing in support of the constitution during Sunday’s election, four departments in the lowlands appeared to have rejected the document. The prelude to Bolivia’s Sunday vote reflected the deep divide among the country’s citizens in terms of how the country should move forward. In 2008, autonomy votes in those four departments sparked violent protests. A recall vote in August reaffirmed Morales’ legitimacy. An October compromise between government supporters and opposition leaders—accompanied by multiple changes to the draft of the constitution—paved the way for Sunday’s referendum.

In his blog Pronto, Bolivian political scientist Miguel Centellas warns about the political fractures running through Bolivia and notes that, even though Morales won the recall vote by a wider margin than he won the presidential election, his support dropped in eastern and southern departments. “As the date of the referendum approaches, new political divisions are emerging,” writes Centellas. Leaders of Bolivia’s evangelical movement, previously supportive of Morales, have come down on the side of “no” on the constitution, citing opposition to provisions they say encourage abortion and homosexuality. Furthermore, indigenous political leaders once aligned with Morales’ party Movimiento al Socialismo and former President Carlos Meza joined the voices against the document. Morales has accused his detractors of failing to offer viable political alternatives to his proposal.

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, the electorate voted and rejected a new constitution in 2007, dealing a blow to Chávez’s ambitions to mark Venezuela’s Magna Carta with his agenda. Venezuelans will soon decide whether to allow Chávez to run for reelection indefinitely. Keeping in line with constitutional law, Chávez’s Partido Socialista Unido collected more than 5.5 million signatures to hold the referendum. Facing the economic impact of declining oil prices, Chávez decided to push for the referendum as soon as possible, while his popularity continues to run high. The Los Angeles Times reports that, despite Chavez’s high approval ratings, polls show the president in danger of facing defeat next month. As the February 15 vote approaches, protesters against the vote have taken to the streets. On Tuesday, marchers clashed with police, who—under Chavez’s orders—used tear gas and water cannons to disrupt the marches.

The government announced that Chávez’s popular Sunday television segment Aló Presidente will not air until after the referendum. However, the president will write a new syndicated column three times a week starting January 22.

Read AS/COA interviews with Venezuelan opposition leader Leopoldo López and student activist Yon Goicoechea.

Updated on January 26, 2009.

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Drug Cartels Move Beyond Borders AS/COA Online 12/19/08

A vigil in Mexico for drug war victims. (AP Images)

Two years after Mexican President Felipe Calderón declared war on the country’s drug cartels, the bloodletting continues to spread. Despite impressive arrests and narcotics seizures, the murder rate doubled in 2008 over the previous year. Moreover, the gangs’ tentacles reach into the highest levels of government down to local police forces. But the drug war’s impact has also been felt well beyond Mexico, with links extending across the Americas, into Europe, and as far as Australia.

Out of fear of the drug war’s overflow, Guatemala plans to deploy several hundred soldiers along its border with Mexico during the next few weeks. In September, Guatemalan President Álvaro Colom accused the cartels of high-level infiltration after it came to light that his office had been bugged. Analyst Sam Logan at ISN Security Watch describes Guatemala as the “release valve” for the cartels, given its low altitude and proximity to paved roads in Mexico. Logan also points out that, in South America, Peru saw ties develop between Mexican drug cartels and the Maoist Shining Path guerillas. Recent attacks on the Peruvian army in which 15 soldiers and two civilians died were blamed on ex-guerrillas hired by Mexican drug traffickers to “secure their trade routes out of the mountains.” According to a UN report, coca cultivation increased in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia by 16 percent since 2001.

The connections appear to reach even further south; Argentina has become a drug trade hub, fueling the U.S. methamphetamine and European cocaine demands. Latin American Thought blog’s Eliot Brockner reports on the recent seizure of 1,000 kilos of cocaine at Buenos Aires’ port. The fact that Mexican drug cartels “can use Argentina as an entry (ephedrine/pseudoephedrine) and exit (cocaine) point suggests there is a fairly well-coordinated smuggling ring capable of transporting large quantities of illicit merchandise across South America,” he writes.

The cartels’ links reach beyond the Americas. A Stratfor analysis covers Mexican connections with Italy’s ‘Ndrangheta organized criminal clan, allowing for drugs to be shipped from Colombia through Mexico to the United States and on to Italy. From there, the drugs could be distributed to the European market. Earlier this month, a cocaine bust involving the arrest of three Mexican nationals by Australia’s federal police uncovered that country’s local link to that Mexico’s cartel.

The 2009 National Threat Assessment published by the National Drug Intelligence Center identifies Mexican drug-trafficking organizations as “the greatest organized crime threat to the United States.” With an eye to the problem, the United States released $197 million to Mexico at the beginning of December—the first of a $400 million package to fight organized crime through the Mérida Initiative.

As the crisis grows, so do the calls for solutions. Harvard International Review’s Jason Larkin suggests that, in the absence of decriminalization or results from increased militarization, negotiation with cartels stands as an option, “just as the U.S. has considered negotiating with the Taliban.” In a lengthy article, OpenDemocracy.net writes that “legalization may become the most effective weapon in the arsenal aimed at organized crime…it seems now is the perfect time to give it a try,” after a thorough analysis of the crisis. A Semana op-ed compares the tragedy facing Mexico to the one in Colombia’s recent history. It recommends that Latin American governments come together to coordinate efforts to halt the bloodshed, which could help affect change internationally. A Cox News Service article looks to similar organized crime circles of the past, ranging from Chicago during Prohibition to Italy’s Mafia, and suggests that peace may come through legalization or by fragmentation of the cartels.

El Universal features a multimedia page that tracks the ongoing violence and keeps a complete tally of the war’s victims in Mexico. Read an AS/COA analysis on how gun smuggling from the United States into Mexico fuels the war.

En español.

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Municipal Elections Test Chávez Popularity AS/COA Online 11/21/08

Election workers set up voting machines for Venezuela’s Sunday vote. (AP Images)

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez hailed the results of Sunday’s municipal elections as a signal that voters “ratified the building of the historic project of Bolivarian socialism.” Indeed, his Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) won 17 of the 22 governorships up for grabs on November 24, when Venezuelans turned out in droves to vote. Venezuela’s electoral agency reported that more than 11,000 electronic voting machines were deployed and 130 high-level international observers from 52 countries oversaw the process to ensure transparency.

Chávez is expected to use the PSUV’s victories as a means to strengthen his mandate and reform the constitution. But the opposition made important gains as well, winning crucial governorships along with the mayoralty of Caracas, arguably the second most important political seat in the county. As Teodoro Petkoff noted in Tal Cual, the opposition made important strides by winning states that accounted for a little more than half of the Venezuelan population but also represented the country’s most important economic, cultural, and political centers.

In addition to choosing 22 of 23 governorships, elections included races for 328 mayoralties and hundreds of legislative offices. With such a large number of contested seats elections up for grabs, the elections measured Chávez’s popularity in a polarized society. The Christian Science Monitor examines how the country finds itself governed by a socialist government that controls vital economic resources but also maintains a capitalistic society that embraces stylish and upscale living.

These heavily contested elections link back to Chávez’ narrow defeat in a December 2007 vote on his proposed constitutional reforms. At the time, the opposition drew strength from newly organized student movement, which counted activist Yon Goicoechea among its leaders, and helped deal a blow to Chávez’ intentions to modify the constitution and engrave in it his so called “socialism of the 21st century.” Still, after the vote, Chávez tightened control over the economy, nationalizing cement, iron, and dairies industries as well as the Banco de Venezuela. He also took steps to circumvent defeat, passing 26 laws that mirrored most of the previously rejected constitutional reforms by using special legislative powers granted by Congress before they expired in July.

Months before Sunday’s municipal elections, the government dealt a blow to the opposition that strengthened Chávez’s hand: The electoral council barred nearly 300 mostly opposition candidates from running for office based on corruption allegations rather than charges. Leopoldo López, the popular mayor of the Chacao municipality of Caracas and a frontrunner in the race for Caracas mayoralty, was among the candidates disqualified. Yet he has remained a prominent figure in this campaign cycle, emphasizing that the opposition movement is “an alternative” rather than “anti-chavista.” Read an exclusive AS/COA interview with López about his alternative political platform.

Among the chief issues Venezuela’s fiscal soundness and growing crime rates. In particular, the upswing in violent crime, which has doubled over the past decade, stood as the top concern for voters. The homicide rate now stands at 48 murders per 100,000 inhabitants (compared to 5.6 per 100,000 in the United States) the Washington Post reports. Shortages of basic food staples like milk and beef harmed Chávez’ popularity rates in the past; since then, the government worked to guarantee sufficient food supply with mixed results.

Yet some argue that Venezuela’s financial outlook is not as grim as has been depicted. Oxford Analytica forecasts that there will be no short-term default in the Venezuelan economy and says that, despite the dropping oil prices, the government should have enough cash to move forward with its high social and fiscal spending in 2009, thanks to hefty reserves and low public debt. Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research writes for ReVista, Harvard’s Latin American review magazine, that despite constant attacks against Chávez’ heavy fiscal spending by the media and foes, the poverty levels in Venezuela dropped significantly since 2003. Weisbrot points out that extreme poverty indicators went from 29.5 percent in 1997 to 9.6 in 2007.

Updated with poll results November 24, 2008.

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Peru’s García Fosters Consensus AS/COA Online 10/17/08

President Alan García and the new Prime Minister Yehude Simon. (AP Images)

Peruvian President Alan García governs at a time of dramatic highs and lows. According to the latest figures, Peru’s economy grew 8.9 percent in August capping off 86 consecutive months of economic expansion. On the other hand, news of a corruption scandal recently rocked his administration when leaked audio recordings provided evidence that high-level officials had solicited bribes from a Norwegian oil company in exchange for concessions. On October 10, García’s entire cabinet resigned and the Peruvian Congress ordered an investigation into oil concessions that took place since García took office in 2006. In the wake of the corruption scandal, the president’s popularity level reached a low of 19 percent.

Still, García has been credited for reacting swiftly to overcome concerns about his administration. He reappointed the defense, finance, justice, trade, and education ministers. Moreover, he chose Yehude Simon, the popular left-leaning regional governor of Lambayeque, to serve as Peru’s new prime minister. The Financial Times described the selection of Simon as an opportunity to “ help García’s administration communicate with Peru’s disenchanted leftwing parties and unions.” An editorial in El Comercio lauds García’s fast intervention and also commends the new prime minister for his ability to build consensus, a skill that could help the García’s administration get a boost in approval ratings.

Despite strong economic indicators in recent years, the president faces slumping support as opponents charge the country’s new wealth has not closed its social inequality gap. Roughly 39 percent of Peru’s population lives in poverty. The Economist points out that the lack of confidence in the president and his political party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), brings back “memories of his disastrous first stint in power in the 1980s,” when García governed from 1985 to 1990. But the purging of the president’s cabinet could be seen as a new commitment to stamping out corruption. In one of his first acts since taking office, Simon—a political prisoner during the Fujimori regime and known for transparency—proposed an anti-corruption plan that García will likely approve.

In an article for RGE’s Latin America EconoMonitor, Walter Molano defines Peru as “one of the most resilient economies in Latin America, and the star of the emerging markets class.” He highlights the fact that the commodities boom allowed Peru’s Central Bank to accumulate hefty international reserves, lower its foreign debt tab, and create leeway to mitigate the effects of the world’s financial slowdown. Peru plans to issue a $600 million international bond sale at a time when credit markets are frozen and wary investors have been withdrawing from emerging markets. The newly reappointed Finance Minister Luis Valdivieso commented on the decision by saying, “those of us who are confident in our economic performance don’t have to see multilateral or emergency financing as the only option.”

At the same time that Peru’s government faced a cabinet shuffle, a terrorist threat reemerged. An October 10 attack on an army convoy by members of the Shining Path claimed the lives of 19 people. Days later, an ambush in the coca-growing region of Vizcatan resulted in two more deaths in another attack linked to the Maoist group. The movement, once 10,000 strong, has remained largely dormant since authorities captured leader Abimael Guzman in 1992. Some posit that drug money has fueled the group’s resurgence but that the group only commands 600 rebels.

Read an article by COA’s Eric Farnsworth about how Peru, with García at the helm, has emerged as both an important regional player and plays a growing role in Asia-Pacific economic relations, demonstrated by the fact that it plays host to the APEC leaders summit in November.

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Interview: Alfonso Quiroz on Constitutional Reform in the Andes AS/COA Online 09/18/08

In an exclusive interview, Professor Alfonso Quiroz speaks to AS/COA’s Carlos Macias about the history of constitutional changes in Latin America with an eye to recent proposed reforms in Andean nations. Venezuela voted against a new constitution in December 2007, Ecuador prepares for a vote on September 28, and Bolivia’s push for a new constitution has served as a source of tension leading to deep political rifts. In this interview, Quiroz underlines the centralization of power in the hands of the executive branch as an essential feature connecting the proposed constitutions.

A history professor at Baruch College, Quiroz is the author of Corrupt Circles: A History of Unbound Graft in Peru. He received the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation fellowship in the field of Latin American constitutional law.

AS/COA: What are some of the hemispheric precedents for this trend of constitutional reforms happening now in Latin America?

Quiroz: I would say that we’re witnessing a new wave of constitutional reforms in the last few years and it’s different from the constitutional reforms that existed in the late 1980s and 1990s. Earlier reforms, especially in the 1990s, showed a trend towards adjusting institutions in Latin American countries to a new wave of democratization that was happening at that time and that was also connected to the fall of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The reforms were part of a global expansion of democracy, so countries in the 1990s—you have the case of Colombia and Mexico and other Latin American countries—began to adapt to that transition. In the case of Colombia, for example, you also had an important constitutional reform that shifted the voting and power bases from the countryside to the urban sector. It was a major shift in Latin American countries to modernize their institutional structures.

The new wave that we’re seeing nowadays is, to a certain degree, a kind of reaction in a new historical and international environment, where the United States is no longer so much interested or so much willing to engage in Latin American issues due to other affairs that the United States has to deal with in the Middle East and in other parts of the world. In Latin America, therefore, this situation has provoked a series of reactions from certain leaders such as [Venezuela’s] Hugo Chávez, [Bolivia’s] Evo Morales, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. They are at the forefront of a distinctive move toward expanding the powers of the president. Within larger constitutional issues in Latin America going back to the nineteenth century, the issue of the executive and the controls of the executive, and the ways of maintaining or limiting the presidential power are at stake at this time in those countries. You can see it as a reverse of the process that existed in the 1990s.

AS/COA: What are the pros and cons of the current constitutional drafts, which open the door to presidential reelections?

Quiroz: The newer reforms suggested and some of those being implemented are being propelled by certain popular support. At least at the beginning, the promises of more inclusion of the populace in the political process, a series of affirmations of minorities’ rights, even the existence of popular presidents with charisma, all those factors have contributed to rising expectation in those countries for change—changes that, generally, in Latin America, are expressed in constitutional change because that is the way of shifting power bases in moments where emerging forces seek to transform the political system. As we know, the rules and regulations of the state, sometimes the policy-oriented emphasis, all those elements are seen by the popular support of these constitutional reforms as bringing about important benefits for the majority of the population.

Let’s just remember a very important case that we can say was, to a certain degree, comparable to the situation today: The enormous expectation that the Cuban constitution of 1940 could provide the necessary rights and democracy and distribution of income that was expected in Cuba, especially because [Fulgencio] Batista undermined that constitution through his dictatorship. One of the first important fights was for the restitution of the constitution of 1940, which after the Cuban Revolution was never brought back. Instead, a constitution that limited democracy was established many years later under a totalitarian type of regime.

AS/COA: Can we talk about the connections between the proposed changes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela? What is the underlying connection between these changes?

Quiroz: One of the main connections, of course, is the centralization of power and the preeminence of the executive over the other branches of the state, which mainly means aiming at less constitutional control on the presidential branch, or less checks and balances. There are other common elements, in the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia regarding ethnic minorities and the power bases of certain regions or the weight of local provinces or states within the larger national unit. This is an important subject that’s being debated. It has been addressed in other Latin American countries, even in Spain in the late twentieth century.

Countries like Bolivia and Ecuador now have regional issues that remain unsolved, and bring about a series of conflicts and frictions that are expressed in the constitutional and electoral debates of those countries. The use of referendum and their disputed legality and outcomes are producing the conflictive part of the process. The problem is how you bring about constitutional change by using established constitutional rules or introducing other types of rules to achieve that. That’s a serious problem that appears as the events unfold.

Read the interview as originally published at the AS/COA website.